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Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime
Elizabeth S. Scott*
I am delighted to be a part of this symposium on Law & Adolescence. I am going to talk
today about adolescent development and juvenile justice policy–or more specifically, about why
policy that is grounded in scientific knowledge about adolescence and the role of criminal
activity during this developmental period is better than the contemporary approach, which often
pays little attention to differences between adolescents and adults– better for young offenders
and better for society.
My talk is based on a book on juvenile justice policy that I am currently writing with
Larry Steinberg, a developmental psychologist who is a leading expert on adolescence. For about
10 years, Larry and I have worked together on an interdisciplinary research network sponsored
by the MacArthur Foundation– the Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice.1 The purpose of the Network has been to examine how scientific knowledge about
adolescence and juvenile crime can usefully inform policy and practice, to determine where there
are gaps in that knowledge and to develop and conduct research studies that can fill those gaps
and inform policymaking in this area. The book offers a framework for youth crime policy that
we have developed through our work in the Network. Our thesis is that scientific knowledge
about adolescence and youth crime is critically important as a foundation for satisfactory
juvenile justice policy and that (for the most part) this premise translates into a legal regime that

*

This essay was presented as a keynote lecture at the Conference on Law and Adolescence at the Beasley
School of Law at Temple University on March 17, 2006. As noted, the lecture draws on many years of collaborative
work with Laurence Steinberg, and is based on a forthcoming co-authored book on juvenile justice policy.
1
Larry Steinberg is the director of the Network and is the Laura Carneal Distinguished Professor of
Psychology at Temple University.
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deal with young offenders as an intermediate legal category of persons – neither children nor
adults.
The idea that developmental knowledge about adolescence is relevant to the regulation of
youth crime has been largely ignored in the punitive law reforms of the past generation–but
lately this perspective has been getting attention. Last year, the United States Supreme Court in
Roper v. Simmons held that imposing the death penalty on offenders for crimes committed as
juveniles is unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.2 The Court offered several bases for this conclusion– but the heart of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion is a proportionality analysis that draws on an article Larry Steinberg and I
wrote in the American Psychologist in 2004.3 In the article, we argued that the scientific
knowledge about adolescence supports the position that the criminal choices of young
offenders–even 17 year olds–are less blameworthy than those of adults. This afternoon, I will
talk about Simmons and the developmental argument for mitigation that the Court adopted–
(fleshing out some parts that Justice Kennedy did not include) and then apply the mitigation
framework more broadly to juvenile crime policy. I also hope to show that the case for a justice
regime based on developmental knowledge is grounded not only in fairness to young offenders–
which ultimately may not carry the day in the political arena– but in a pragmatic calculation of
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Roper v. Simmons, 553 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).

3

Simmons, 553 U.S. at 569. Justice Kennedy points out that juveniles are more immature, irresponsible,
and subject to peer pressure than adults. Drawing on the framework developed by Elizabeth Scott and Laurence
Steinberg, he described three key attributes of adolescence: immature decision-making skills, vulnerability to peer
pressure, and an undeveloped character. citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST, 1009, 1014 (Dec. 2003)(hereinafter Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence)). These characteristics
correspond to standard bases of mitigation in criminal law. See also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg,
Blaming Youth, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 799 (2003).
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the interests of the rest of society. And finally, I will suggest that this is a good time to begin a
new era of law reform in the area of juvenile justice.

A. The Culpability of Adolescent Criminal Choices: the Argument for Mitigation
The story of Simmons is familiar- at least to this audience. The Supreme Court agreed to
accept certiorari two years after it held in Atkins v. Virginia that imposing the death penalty on
mentally retarded persons is unconstitutional under the 8th Amendment.4 Simmons came to the
Court after the Missouri Supreme Court found that state’s juvenile death penalty statute
unconstitutional under Atkins. Chris Simmons was probably not the juvenile that child advocates
would have chosen to challenge the death penalty. He was 17 years old when he and a friend
broke into a woman’s home and then brutally murdered her by taping her up & throwing her in a
near-by river. There were different accounts of why the youths killed their victim. Some
testimony suggested that Chris panicked when the victim recognized him– but there was also a
report that– weeks before the killing, he had said he wanted to kill someone.5 In general, to be
honest, Chris was not a person likely to arouse much sympathy. So- in a state like Missouri with
a death penalty, why shouldn’t he be eligible?
The answer to this question, according to the Court, lies in the bedrock principle of
proportionality–which holds, [as many of you may remember from your 1st year Criminal Law
class], that criminal punishment should be based not only on the harm caused, but also on the

4

Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002) (holding that mentally retarded persons have educed
culpability, and thus executing them would be a violation of the 8th Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment).
5

Brenna–this might be in Liz Emens S. Ct. Rev. Article.
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blameworthiness of the offender. In capital cases, the harm is as bad as it gets– a nasty murder.
The Court in Simmons found, however, that executing Chris Simmons and other juveniles would
violate the 8th Amendment because adolescents under the age of 18 – due to their immaturity -are
not among the “worst offenders” for whom the punishment of death is reserved.
Drawing on research in developmental psychology, the Court pointed to several
dimensions of adolescence that distinguish young offenders from adults in ways that mitigate
culpability. These include deficiencies in decisionmaking ability, greater vulnerability to
external coercion and the relatively unformed nature of adolescent character. Although the Court
did not elaborate, each of these attributes of adolescence corresponds to a conventional source of
mitigation in criminal law6– and together they offer strong evidence that young offenders are not
as culpable as adults. Let’s look at each of these.
First, – consider diminished capacity. Under standard criminal law doctrine, actors
whose decision- making capacities are impaired– by mental illness or retardation for example, –
are deemed less blameworthy than typical offenders.7 If the impairment is severe, their crimes
are excused.8 There is considerable evidence that children and adolescents are less capable
decision-makers than adults in ways that are relevant to their criminal choices.
Although few would question this claim as applied to children, the picture is more

6

See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 3; Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence, supra note 3.
7

RICHARD BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 585 ( 2d ed. Foundation Press 2004)(1997) (explaining that
sentences could be greatly reduced if the offender had a “significantly reduced mental capacity”).
8

An offender may be excused from all criminal responsibility under the insanity defense if he suffers from
severe mental illness or disability. The standard formulation of the insanity test (the M’Naghten rule) requires proof
that the actor, at the time he committed the offense, did not appreciate the nature or quality of his act or did not know
that it was wrong. Id. at 531-540.
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complicated for offenders such as Chris Simmons who are 16 or 17 years old. The capacities for
reasoning and understanding improve significantly from late childhood into adolescence, and by
mid-adolescence, most teens are close to adults in their ability to reason and to understand
information (what you might call “pure” cognitive capacities)– at least in the abstract. The
reality, however, is that they are likely less capable than are adults in using these capacities in
making real-world choices – partly because of lack of experience and partly because teens are
less efficient than adults in processing information.9 In life– and particularly on the street, the
ability to quickly marshal information may be essential to competent decisionmaking.
Also, other aspects of psychological development that affect decisionmaking lag behind
cognitive development and undermine adolescent competence. The research documents what
most parents of adolescents already know– the decisions of teenagers are subject to psychosocial
and emotional influences that contribute to immature judgment which can lead them to make bad
choices.10 [It’s probably not surprising that I first became interested in these issues when my
daughter Christy was about 14 years old. An orthopedist suggested that if Christy’s mild
scoliosis got worse she might need to wear a body brace. Her response basically was that she
would rather spend her life as a pretzel than wear a body brace.]
Christy understood as well as any adult what the surgeon was telling us about her

9

Brenna– Cite (maybe one of the papers L Steinberg sent us) ??
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Social science research confirms that adolescents differ from adults in several ways that contribute to
immature judgment– in their attitudes toward risks, the weight attached to short-term versus long-term
consequences, and in peer conformity and susceptibility to peer influence. Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and
Reasoning in Adolescent Decisonmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1642 (1992); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating
Adolescent Decisionmaking in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAV. 221, 229 (1995); Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psycho-social Factors in Adolescent Decisonmaking, 20
LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 249 (1996) (providing evidence that age-linked differences in maturity of judgment account
for differences in decisionmaking).
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condition, the medical options and the consequences of choosing– or not choosing– the
recommended procedure. But, as her response suggests, teens tend to lack what
developmentalists call “future orientation,” – that is, as compared to adults, adolescents are
more likely to focus on the here-and-now and less likely to think about the long-term
consequences of their choices or actions–and when they do, they are inclined to assign less
weight to future consequences than to immediate risks and benefits.11 Over a period of years
between mid-adolescence and early adulthood, individuals become more future oriented. There
is every reason to believe that by age 21, Christy might have made a different decision in the
interest of her future health.
Substantial research evidence also supports the conventional wisdom that teens are more
oriented toward peers and responsive to peer influence than are adults. Several studies show that
susceptibility to peer influence, especially in situations involving pressure to engage in antisocial
behavior, increases between childhood and mid-adolescence, peaks around age 14, and declines
slowly during the late adolescent years.12 Increased susceptibility to peer pressure in early
11

William Gardner and Jana Herman found that adolescents tend to discount the future and focus more on
short-term consequences of their actions, hypothesizing that this tendency relates to the greater uncertainty young
people have about their futures. This results in an increase in risk taking behavior because only immediate negative
consequences will be taken into account and future harmful consequences will be ignored. William Gardner and Jana
Herman, Adolescents AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, 50 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEV. 17,
25-26 (1991). See also Thomas Cottle et al., Adolescent Perception of Time: The Effect of Age, Sex, and Social
Class, 37 PERSONALITY 636, 636-50 (noting that young adolescents are preoccupied with the present and that a
sense of extended future has not yet formed); Anita Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of
Things Future Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99, 100 (1986) (changes in temporal perspective continue to
occur through late adolescence); Jari -Erik Nurmi, How do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the
Development of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 29 (1991) (finding that youths make
gains in their capacity to understand and predict events in the future over an extended period between the ages of 11
and 18).
12

See J.S. COLEMAN & W.A. COLLINS, ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY: A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW
(1988)(finding that social conformity peaks in 9th grade in situations involving anti-social behavior); Phillip R.
Costanzo & Marvin E. Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Age Level, 37 CHILD DEV. 967, 967-75 (1966)
(confirming the hypothesis that conformity increases up to adolescence and declines afterwards); Laurence Steinberg
& Susan B Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV. 841, 848 (1986)
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adolescence may reflect changes in individuals’ capacity for self-direction (as parental influence
declines), as well as changes in the intensity of pressure that teens exert on each other. Some
studies suggest that adolescents who engage in certain types of antisocial behavior may enjoy
higher status among their peers as a consequence– perhaps because they appear to be
independent of adult authority. The net result is that adolescents are more likely than either
children or adults to change their decisions and alter their behavior in response to peer pressure.
Peer influence affects adolescent judgment both directly and indirectly. In some
contexts, adolescents might make choices in response to direct peer pressure, as when they are
coerced to take risks that they might otherwise avoid. More indirectly, desire for peer approval
(and fear of rejection) affects adolescent choices, even without direct coercion. Teens appear to
seek peer approval especially in group situations. Thus, perhaps it is not surprising that young
offenders are far more likely than adults to commit crimes in groups.13
Consider the case of Timothy Kane, a 14 years old junior high school student who never
had any contact with the justice system until one Sunday afternoon in January, 1992. Tim was
playing video games with a group of friends, when a couple of older youths suggested that they
break into a neighbor’s house. Tim agreed to go along. Upon entering the house, the boys were
surprised to find the elderly neighbor and her son at home– whereupon the two older boys killed
them, while Timothy watched from under the dining room table. Interviewed years later as he

(presenting research demonstrating age differences in susceptibility to peer pressure); Scott et al. supra note 4 at
229-30; Steinberg & Caufman, supra note 4, at 257-59. NORMAN SPRINTHALL & W. ANDREW COLLINS,
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY: A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW 269 (2d ed. 1988).
13
Albert Reiss, Jr. & David Farrington, Advancing Knowledge About Co-Offending: Results from a
Prospective Longitudinal Survey of London Males, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 260, 361-62 (1991).
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served a life sentence under Florida’s draconian felony murder law, Timothy explained that he
went along because he didn’t want to stay behind alone– and he didn’t want to be called a
“scaredy-cat.”14 I would argue that Timothy’s fatal decision to get involved in the break-in was
– more than anything else– the conduct of a 14 year old worried about peer approval.
Justice Kennedy in Simmons noted another psychosocial factor that contributes to
immature judgment – adolescents are both less likely to perceive risks and less risk-averse than
adults.15 Thus, it is not surprising, perhaps, that they enjoy engaging in activities like speeding,
unsafe sex, excessive drinking, and committing crimes more than adults. The story is actually a
bit more complicated. In the abstract- on paper & pencil tests- , adolescents are capable of
perceiving risks almost as well as adults.16 In the real world however, risk preference and other
dimensions of psycho-social immaturity interact to encourage risky choices.
Another story– this one about a colleague’s son– makes this point aptly. At 2 a.m. one
Sunday morning, 14- year-old Ben and several friends secretly left the house where they were
spending the night to visit one of the boys’ girlfriends, who lived nearby. When they arrived at

14

Adam Liptak, No Way Out: America’s Youngest Lifers Locked Away Forever After Crimes as Teenagers,
NEW YORK TIMES, October 3, 2005 at A1.
15

Simmons, 553 U.S. at 569.

16

Early researchers such as Jean Piaget developed theories of cognitive development, under which midadolescents’ abilities to think about problems hypothetically and weigh and compare consequences were similar to
adults. See generally BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO
ADOLESCENCE (1952) (describing cognitive development in children between 11 and 15 years of age); JOHN H.
FLAVELL, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 92-101 (2d ed. 1985) (describing generalizations drawn from Piaget’s theories);
ROBERT S. SIEGLER, CHILDREN’S THINKING 20-21, 26-38 (2d ed. 1991) (describing different developmental stages
outlined by Piget). Piaget focused on “pure” cognitive development, however, and modern researchers contend that
adolescents’ perceptions of risks are more complicated because psycho-social development proceeds more slowly
than cognitive development. See Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: What Changes and Why?,1021
ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI., 51-58 (2004) (noting that although after age thirteen there are no age differences in risk
perception, adolescents are far more likely to take risks than adults due to a desire for novel experiences and a
slower development of self-regulatory capabilities, attributes that continue to develop into late adolescence and
adulthood,).
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the girl’s home, they threw pebbles at her window to wake her. Unfortunately, this set off a
burglar alarm, which sounded a siren and sent a silent dispatch to the local police station. Upon
hearing the siren, the boys ran-- right into a patrol car that was racing toward the house. Instead
of stopping and explaining their situation to the police, Ben and his friends panicked and
scattered. One of the boys was apprehended by the police and taken home. The others returned
to the house where they were spending the night.
The next morning, Ben’s father received a phone call from the girl’s parents, explaining
what had happened. After picking Ben up and lecturing him about the dangers of running away,
in the dark, from armed police who thought they had interrupted a burglary, his father asked him,
rhetorically, “What were you thinking?” “That’s the problem, Dad,” Ben said. “I wasn’t.”
It seems probable that the presence of his friends, together with distress created by the arrival of
the police, overwhelmed the decision-making capacities of an otherwise intelligent and lawabiding teenager. In a laboratory study, Ben likely would have identified risks of this situation
as well as any adult. The lesson of the story is that risk assessment (and decision making) on the
street may present challenges to teens greater than those faced by adults.
Another (compatible) account of why adolescents take more risks than adults is that they
may evaluate both the risks and benefits of risky activity differently. Psychologists refer to the
outcome of weighing risks and benefits as the “risk-reward ratio”; the higher the ratio, the less
likely an individual is to engage in the behavior in question. Studies suggest that, in calculating
the risk-reward ratio that guides decision-making, adolescents may discount risks– and assign

9

greater weight to the rewards of a choice than do adults.17 In studies involving gambling games,
teens tend to focus more on potential gains relative to losses than do adults.18 So, for example, in
deciding whether to speed while driving a car, adolescents may weigh the potential rewards of
the behavior (e.g., the thrill of driving fast, peer approval, getting to one’s destination quickly,
etc.) more heavily than adults, and discount the risks (having an accident, getting a ticket). What
distinguishes adolescents from adults in this regard, then, is not the fact that teens are less
knowledgeable about risks, but, rather, that they attach different value to the rewards that risktaking provides.
Emerging evidence suggests that the special salience of rewards to adolescents may be
driven by the hormonal changes of puberty. In particular, the tendency of adolescents to seek
more novelty and to require higher levels of stimulation to achieve pleasure than do adults may
have a hormonal basis. Although most of the relevant brain research on this question comes
from animal studies, there is some support for the notion that developments in the limbic system
of the brain around puberty may account for at least part of this change in reward-seeking that
occurs in adolescence.19
In addition to age differences in susceptibility to peer influence, future orientation, and
risk assessment, adolescents and adults also differ with respect to their ability to control

17

See Gardner & Herman, Adolescent AIDS Risk Taking at 24 (noting that adolescents focus less on
protection against losses and more on opportunities for gains in making choices, which is why they are more likely
to engage in risky behavior such as unprotected sex); See also Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in
Adolescence: A Decisionmaking Perspective, 12 DEV. REV. 1, 1-2 (1992) (describing decision making about risky
behavior in a rational decisionmaking model).
18

Gardner study?? Check my Villanova article

19

Patricia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE &
BEHAVIORAL REV. 417, 421 (2000) (reviewing animal and human research on brain maturation indicating that a type
of “remodeling” of the brain occurs during adolescent among species).
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impulsive behavior and choices.20 Thus, the conventional wisdom that teens are more reckless
than adults is supported by research on developmental changes in impulsivity and selfmanagement. In general, studies show gradual but steady increases in the capacity for selfdirection through adolescence, with gains continuing through the high school years. Research
also indicates that adolescents are subject to more rapid and extreme mood swings (both positive
and negative) than are adults.21 [Not surprising to many parents]. Although the connection
between moodiness and impulsivity is not clear, it is likely that extreme levels of emotional
arousal (either anger or elation) are associated with difficulties in self-control . Although more
research is needed, the available evidence indicates that adolescents may have more difficulty
regulating their moods, impulses, and behaviors than do adults.
These psycho-social and emotional factors contribute to immature judgment in
adolescence and likely play a role in decisions by teens to engage in criminal activity. It is easy
to imagine how individuals whose choices are subject these developmental influences –
susceptibility to peer influence, poor risk assessment, sensation seeking, a tendency to give more
weight to short-term consequences of choices and poor impulse control– might decide to engage
in criminal conduct.
Consider the following scenario. A teen hangs out with his buddies on the street, when–
on the spur of the moment– , someone suggests holding up a near- by convenience store. The

20

Studies tend to show a gradual increase in an individual’s self direction and ability to control impulsivity.
The gains occur gradually over the course of adolescence and continue through the final years of high school.
ELLEN GREENBERGER, Education and the Acquisition of Psycho-Social Maturity, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL
MATURITY (David C. McClelland ed., 1982).
21
Reed Larson et al., Mood Variability and the Psycho-Social Adjustment of Adolescents, 9 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE, 469, 488 (1980) (presenting a study finding wider mood fluctuations among adolescents than adults).
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youth doesn’t really go through a formal decision making process, but he “chooses” to go along,
even though he has mixed feelings. Why? First and most important, like Tim Kane, he may
assume that his friends will reject him if he declines to participate - - a negative consequence to
which he attaches substantial weight in considering alternatives. He does not think of options to
extricate himself - - although a more mature person might do so. This may be because he lacks
experience, because the choice is made so quickly, or because he has difficulty projecting the
course of events into the future. Also, the “adventure” of the hold-up and the possibility of
getting some money are exciting. These immediate rewards (together with peer approval) weigh
more heavily in his decision than the (remote) possibility of apprehension by the police. He
never considers the long term costs of conviction of a serious crime.22
This account is consistent with the general developmental research and it suggests how
factors that are known to affect adolescent decision-making in general are likely to operate in
this setting. As a general proposition, it is uncontroversial that teens are inclined to engage in
risky behaviors that reflect their immaturity of judgment.

[If none of this sounds familiar in

regard to the teens in your life, then you’re very fortunate.] Overall, it seems very likely that the
psycho-social influences that shape adolescents decision-making in other settings contribute to
their choices about criminal activity as well– although, for obvious reasons, getting direct
evidence about decision-making on the street may be impossible. Of course, not every teen gets
involved in crime- that depends on a lot of things, including social context. But the important
point is that these psycho-social and emotional influences on decisionmaking are normative–as
psychologists use this term- that is, typical of adolescents as a group and developmental in
22
This account is adapted from Elizabeth S. Scott and Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 NW. U. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 166 (1997).
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nature.23
As I have suggested, research in the last few years indicates that some of these
psychological factors may have biological underpinnings. Very recent studies of brain
development show that important structural changes take place during adolescence in the frontal
lobes, most importantly in the prefrontal cortex.24 This region of the brain is central to what
psychologists call “executive functions”-- advanced thinking processes that are employed in
planning ahead, regulating emotions, controlling impulses and weighing the costs and benefits of
decisions before acting. Thus, the immature judgment of teens to some extent may be a function
of hard wiring.
That immaturity is mitigating of culpability as a form of diminished decision-making
capacity is not controversial, at least as a general proposition – even the Simmons dissenters
accept this point.25 What is not so obvious is that two other sources of mitigation in criminal law
also apply to adolescents– and reinforce the conclusion that young offenders are less
23

Almost 80 % of teen age boys report having engaged in criminal activity for which they could be
incarcerated. National Youth Survey . See discussion at t.a.n. __to _ infra._(Brenna-- can we find & cite this
survey instead of just citing Moffitt? ).
24

Spear, supra note 15 at 423 (noting that the ability to perform complicated planning and decisionmaking
may be immature well into middle or late adolescence). Research suggests that changes in the prefrontal cortex
occur into late adolescence and play a role in the maturation of an adolescent’s ability to self-regulate. Steinberg,
Risk Taking in Adolescence at 57. See also ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND
THE CIVILIZED MIND 35 (2001)(noting that the prefrontal cortex, which affects planning, organizing, and
understanding consequences is one of the last parts of the brain to develop).
25

In her dissent, Justice O’Connor agreed that the proportionality issues raised by the majority implicated
Eighth Amendment concerns. Brenna– do dissenters say anything about immature decisionmaking as
mitigating? Also check Thompson v. Okla & Stanford v. Ky. (Earlier juvenile DP decisions) She argued that
rather than establishing a categorical rule, individual juries should give “appropriate mitigating weight to the
defendant’s immaturity.” Simmons, 553 at 602-03. General sentencing guidelines often consider youth and
immaturity to be mitigating factors. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026 (West 2001) (including impaired
cognitive/volitional capacity, mental disorder, domination by another, and youth); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4637(b),
(e), (g)-(h) (1995) (including extreme mental distress, mental disorder, domination by another, impaired
cognitive/volitional capacity and age); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(b)-(d), (g), (1995 & Supp. 2001) (including
extreme emotional distress, domination by another, impaired cognitive/volitional capacity and age).
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blameworthy than their adult counterparts.
The first source of mitigation involves situations in which a person offends in response to
extreme external pressures. (Think about the defenses of provocation and duress.) The criminal
law does not require exceptional forbearance or bravery; a defense (or a reduced sentence) may
be available if an ordinary (ie “reasonable”) person might have responded to the situation in the
same way the defendant did.26 Because of the coercive circumstances, the actor is deemed less
blameworthy than other offenders.
In Simmons, the Court recognized that “ordinary” adolescents are subject to peer
pressure to a far greater extent than adults-- including pressure to commit crimes. As I have
suggested, most juvenile crimes, including Chris Simmons’ murder, are committed in groups –
while most adult criminals act alone. In some high-crime neighborhoods, peer pressure to
commit crimes is so powerful that only exceptional kids escape. As Jeffrey Fagan and others
have found, in these settings, resisting this pressure can result in loss of status, ostracism– and
vulnerability to physical assault.27 The circumstances many teens face in these social contexts
are similar to those involved in claims of duress, provocation, necessity or domination by codefendants–and are appropriately deemed mitigating of culpability. The case for mitigation on
26

The defense of duress is available to a defendant who faces a threat of death or bodily harm in a situation
that he or she has no reasonable opportunity to avert the harm other than committing the crime with which he is
charged. RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., supra note 5 at 478-92 (discussing duress as a situational defense available
only where external circumstances are extremely coercive; ie. Harm to reputation is not adequate)..
27

Jeffery Fagan & Deanna Wilkinson, The Role of Firearms in Violence “Scripts:” The Dynamics of Gun
Events Among Adolescent Males, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 64-66 (1996) (describing the way in which the
peer social context coerces youths to follow set scripts that can lead to violent confrontation). Conformity in these
situations is enforced with the threat of severe sanctions such as violence and loss of social status. Id. at 63-64. See
also Jeffery Fagan, Context and Culpability in Adolescent Crime, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 507, 535-38 (1999)
(describing how coercive social contexts influence the criminal choices adolescents); Jeffery Fagan, Contexts of
Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE 376 (Thomas Grisso and Robert Schwartz, eds., University of Chicago 2000) (arguing that social context
predicts violent adolescent behavior);.
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this ground seems all the more compelling because, unlike adults, adolescents as legal minors are
not free to leave their schools, homes and neighborhoods. When teens cross the line to legal
adulthood, of course, the formal disabilities of youth are lifted. Young adults can avoid the
pressure by removing themselves from the social setting in which avoiding involvement in crime
is difficult. Thus, it is reasonable that adults can not claim this kind of situational mitigation.
A third source of mitigation in criminal law is evidence that a criminal act was out-ofcharacter. At sentencing, offenders can often introduce evidence of their general good character
to demonstrate that the offense was an aberrant act.28 Here mitigation applies to the crimes of
young offenders as well– not because of their good character per se – but because their
characters are unformed.
Beginning with Erik Erikson, psychologists have explained that an important
developmental task of adolescence is the formation of personal identity-- a process linked to
psycho-social development, that for most teens extends over several years until a coherent “self”
emerges in late adolescence or early adulthood.29 During adolescence, identity is fluid – values,
plans, attitudes and beliefs are likely to be tentative as teens struggle to separate from their
parents and figure out who they are. This process involves a lot of experimentation, which for
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The criminal behavior must “represent a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise lawabiding life.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.20, cmt. n.1(c)(1998). State sentencing guidelines also
allow mitigation based on past reputation and character. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026 (2)(h)(j) (West 2001)
(allowing mitigation if the crime was an isolated incident and the defendant has shown remorse); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 211E § 3(d)(13)-(14), (16) (2001) (allowing mitigation based on family ties, character, family
responsibilities and personal history); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14A1340.16(e)(12)(2001)(allowing mitigation for
community reputation).
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Research suggests that most identity development occurs late in the adolescent period. LAURENCE
STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE 273-79 (6th ed. McGraw-Hill 2002). A coherent sense of identity in the areas of
ideological values and beliefs, occupation, and interpersonal relations typically does not solidify before age 18. Id.
at 263-64.
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many kids means engaging in the risky activities I’ve described– including involvement in
crime. Self-report studies have found that 80-90% of teen age boys admit to committing crimes
for which they could be incarcerated.30
But, the typical teen-age delinquent does not grow up to be an adult criminal. The
statistics consistently show that 17 year olds commit more crimes than any other age group–after
that age, the crime rate declines steeply.31 Most adolescents literally grow out of their antisocial
tendencies as they attain psycho-social maturity and individual identity becomes settled. How
many adults look back on their risky adventures or mishaps as teenagers with chagrin and
amazement? [Maybe some of us??] Almost every time I teach my Children in the Legal
System course, I hear confessions from upstanding law students about their delinquent exploits
as adolescents- – often with expressions of gratitude at their good fortune in emerging relatively
unscathed.
The research supports that much juvenile crime stems from experimentation typical of
this developmental stage rather than moral deficiencies reflecting bad character. It is fair to
assume that most adults who engage in criminal conduct act on subjectively defined values and
preferences – and that their choices can be charged to deficient moral character. Thus an
impulsive adult whose “adolescent” traits” lead him to get involved in crime is quite different
from a risk-taking teen. Adolescent traits are not typical of adulthood. The values & preferences
30

Brenna– see if you can get the National youth survey Terrie Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life
Course Persistent Anti-Social Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675(1993)
(describing certain criminal activity as a “normal part of teen life”).
31

See RICHARD JESSOR & SHIRLEY L. JESSOR, PROBLEM BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: A
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF YOUTH 145-63 (1977); David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN
ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 189 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986) (describing a declining crime rate
late in adolescence); David P. Farrington, Offending From 10 to 25 Years of Age, in PROSPECTIVE STUDIES OF CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY 17 (K. Teilman Van Deusen & S.A. Mednick eds., 1983); Moffitt, supra note 25 at 675.
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that motivate the adult criminal are not developmental, but characterological– a part of personal
identity. This cannot be said of the crimes of typical juvenile offenders, whose choices, while
unfortunate, are shaped by developmental factors that are constitutive of adolescence. Like the
adult who offers evidence of good character, most adolescent offenders lack a key component of
culpability–the connection between the bad act and the offender’s bad character. The Court in
Simmons recognized this, rejecting the notion that we can be confident that “even a heinous
crime by an adolescent is the product of an irretrievably depraved character.” 32
The reality, of course, is that not all young offenders grow up to be persons of good
character– some grow up to be criminals. Psychologist Terrie Moffitt, in a major longitudinal
study, has placed adolescent offenders in two rough categories: A large group of what she calls
“adolescent-limited” offenders – typical delinquents whose involvement in crime begins and
ends in adolescence– and a much smaller group that she labels “life-course persistent
offenders”33 The latter are youths whose antisocial conduct often begins in childhood and
continues through adolescence into adulthood; many are in the early stages of criminal careers.
In adolescence, the criminal conduct of kids in these two groups looks pretty similar, but the
underlying causes and the prognosis are different.
This raises an important issue: Even if adolescents (including 17 year olds) generally are
less mature than adults, why shouldn’t immaturity be considered on an individualized basis as is
32

Simmons, 553 U.S. at 570.
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“Life-course persistent offenders,” in Moffitt’s taxonomy are youths who develop a pattern of behavioral
problems and other difficulties early in life, that persist through adolescence into adulthood. These youths may be
subject to inadequate parenting and may experience early neurological problems and learning difficulties. They may
exhibit behavioral problems as children and get involved in criminal conduct at an earlier age than do adolescentlimited offenders. For life-course persistent offenders, antisocial behavior in adolescence is part of a pattern that is
likely to extend into adulthood. Brenna– can you check Moffitt for early traits\symptoms of LCPOs and edit
adjust? Moffit, supra note 25at 682-85.

17

typical of most mitigating conditions? Not all adolescent offenders are unformed youths whose
crimes are driven by developmental forces – some may not deserve lenient treatment on the basis
of immaturity. This question was critical in the context of the juvenile death penalty– but it is
also important in the broader arena of juvenile justice policy. In his Simmons dissent, Justice
Scalia argued that there was no reason to abandon the practice of allowing capital juries to
evaluate the immaturity of juveniles on a case-by-case basis.34
Without question, individual adolescents vary in the pace of psychological development
and character formation. The problem with individualized assessment is that we currently lack
the diagnostic tools to evaluate psycho-social maturity and identity formation on an
individualized basis so as to separate savvy young career criminals from ordinary adolescents.
Justice Kennedy noted the potential for error in distinguishing incipient psychopaths from youths
whose crimes reflect, as he described it, “transient immaturity,” and he expressed concern that
the brutality of the offense might often overwhelm consideration of youth and immaturity.
[Indeed, the prosecutor had argued to the jury that Chris Simmons’ youth was not mitigating, but
aggravating.– A point that Elizabeth Emens explores in her wonderful Supreme Court Review
article on Simmons.]35
There is an important lesson here that extends beyond the death penalty. Courts in some
areas have begun to use a psychopathy checklist (a variation of an instrument developed for

34

Simmons, 553 at 620-21 (arguing that an individual determination by juries is at the foundation of
America’s justice system).
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Brenna--Does note deal with bracketed material? I think Emens Sup. Ct. Review essay is out. Cite
also place in her eaasy describing pros’r statement. Simmons, 553 at 573 (citing from Steinberg and Scott, Less
Guilty at 1014-18); Elizabeth Emens, Roper v. Simmons and Age Discrimination, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2006)
(explaining that where aggravating aspects such as youth and immaturity threaten to overwhelm the juror’s ability to
consider mitigation, a categorical rule protecting juveniles is needed)).
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adults) in an effort to identify adolescent psychopaths– for transfer or sentencing purposes.36
This practice is fraught with the potential for error– and, for this reason, the American
Psychiatric Association restricts the diagnosis of psychopathy to individuals age 18 and older—
evaluating antisocial traits and conduct in adolescence is just too uncertain.37
There is something else to worry about if maturity is litigated on a case-by case basis.
Research evidence suggests that racial and ethnic biases influence attitudes about the punishment
of young offenders; thus, decision-makers may be inclined to discount the mitigating impact of
immaturity in minority youths.38 The integrity of any individualized decision-making process is
vulnerable to contamination from racist attitudes or from unconscious racial stereotyping that
operates even among those who may lack overt prejudice.39 There is evidence that African
American youths are viewed as more mature than same-aged white kids, and all offenders will

36

Elizabeth Cauffman Jennifer Skeem, Views of the Downward Extension: Comparing the Youth Version of
the Psychopathy Checklist with the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 737
(2003)(questioning the validity of methods used to identify adolescent psychopaths); Daniel Seagrave & Thomas
Grisso, Adolescent Development and the Measurement of Juvenile Psychopathy, 26 L. & HUMAN. BEHAV. 219, 224
(noting that traits which may resemble adult psychopathy may be the result of normal adolescent development,
resulting in a misdiagnosis).
37

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
(4 ed. 1994) (listing age 18 as the minimum age requirement to diagnosis a patient with an antisocial personality
disorder or psychopathy).
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M.A. Bortner, Marjorie S. Zatz & Darnell F. Hawkins, Race and Transfer: Empirical Research and Social
Context, in The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice 277, 280 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000)
(explaining that minority youths are most often transferred and punished as adults because they are seen as the worst
offenders). See also Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, The Influence of Race in Juvenile Processing, 25 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 242, 242-58 (1998)(noting that African-Americans are more likely to be recommended for
formal processing, referred to court, adjudicated as delinquent, and given harsher punishments than “comparable”
whites).
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Brenna–This is a published article in Law & human Behavior Sandra Graham & ???, Racial
Stereotypes in the Juvenile Justice System, Presentation at Conference of American Psychology-Law Society (Mar.
9, 2002) (transcript on file with the authors)(showing that law enforcement subjects who were unconsciously primed
to expect that a perpetrator in a crime vignette was African-American were harsher in their judgments in the
perpetrator’s culpability and deserved punishment). See also Bishop & Frazier, supra note 33 at 242-48.
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look more like adults at the time of sentencing than at the time of the crime.
B. Applying the Mitigation Principle to Juvenile justice Policy
The juvenile death penalty is an interesting issue that has captured public attention in the
wake of Simmons– but in practical terms it is not the most important context in which to ask the
question of whether juveniles should face the same procedures and punishment as adults.
[According to Simmons, 123 juveniles had been sentenced to death since 1990– but many
thousands have been tried and punished as adults].40 The developmental evidence that I have
described indicates that adolescent offenders, because of their developmental immaturity, differ
from their adult counterparts in ways mitigate culpability and there is good reason to recognize
this difference through categorical classification of young offenders. I’d like to turn now to the
implications of these conclusions for juvenile crime policy generally.
At the outset, I should say something about why this issue has become so salient in recent
years. Beginning in the late 1980s, major reforms in youth crime policy have transformed a
justice system that viewed most teens as youngsters whose crimes were the product of
immaturity into one that often holds young offenders to the same standards of criminal
accountability it imposes on adults. This movement is based on an unexamined assumption that
whatever differences exist between adults and adolescents are immaterial in devising legal
responses to youth crime. In fact, some advocates for tough policies (like the Simmons
prosecutor) seem to view young offenders as more culpable– and certainly more dangerous–
than adult criminals. John DiUilio’s famous description of “super-predators” in the mid-1990s
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captured the image of teenage criminals as a major threat to society.41 Legislatures across the
country have rushed to enact tough laws lowering the age at which juveniles can be tried and
punished as adults for a broad range of crimes and broadening prosecutorial discretion to charge
youths in adult court.42 Perhaps the most important changes have come in the form of legislative
waiver statutes, under which many youths who are legal minors for most other purposes are
categorically treated as adults when they are charged with certain crimes. This has resulted in
the wholesale transfer of youths into the adult criminal system–over 200,000 a year by most
estimates.43 At the same time, juvenile court dispositions have become more like prison
sentences– often extending well into adulthood. Questions about whether juveniles should be
subject to the same punishment as adults get a lot of attention in high profile murder cases – such
as that of Lionel Tate, the 12 year old Florida boy who was given a life sentence (later reversed)
for killing a 6 year old neighbor girl44 – but the issue also arises in many more mundane cases
41

DiUilio, a criminologist, coined this term in an article predicting that the new century would bring a wave
of juvenile crime far worse than the 1990s. John DiUlio, The Coming of the Super-Predators, WEEKLY STANDARD,
Nov. 27, 1995.
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Elizabeth S. Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 584-85 (2000
(describing the legislative trend of lowering the age at which adult prosecution can occur, either through judicial
transfer or legislative waiver. See note 43 infra.; Patricia Torbet et al., NAT’L. CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS & VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 4 (1996) (describing trend in expanding prosecutorial authority
to directly file charges in criminal court.
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Legislative waivers mandate an automatic adjudication in adult criminal court at a jurisdictional age below
the age of majority for specific offenses or in general. In the 1980s and 1990s, these laws became much more
common. Scott, Legal Construction of Adolescence at 585. In California, for example, after age 14 juveniles are
automatically tried as adults for murder, rape, and several other sexual offenses. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
707(b), (e).
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See State v. Tate, 854 So.2d. 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); See also Michael Browning et al., Boy, Age 14,
Gets Life in T.V Wrestling Death: Killing of 6-Year-Old Playmate Wasn’t Just Horseplay Florida Judge Says,
CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001 at 1. Lionel Tate’s conviction was overturned in 2004, and he was released. In
2005 he violated his parole for holding up a pizza delivery boy, and was sentenced to thirty years in prison in 2006.
Terry Aguayo, Youth Who Killed at 12 Gets 30 Years for Violating Probation, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006 at
A21.
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involving drug sales and property crimes.
These reforms were fueled by rising juvenile crime rates–and particularly homicide
rates– in the late 1980s and early 90s– a legitimate source of concern. In part, the legal changes
reflected disillusionment with the traditional juvenile court and the view that, while the juvenile
system may have met the needs of a simpler time when kids got into schoolyard fistfights, it was
not up to the task of dealing with today’s young criminals who use guns to commit serious
crimes.45 Politicians ridiculed the system and pointed to high recidivism rates as evidence that
rehabilitation was a failure. Supporters of the court sometimes seemed to invite criticism. As
youth crime rates rose, paternalistic descriptions of young criminals as wayward children who
would respond to the caring treatment of the juvenile court began to sound naive.
Proponents of more punitive policies for juveniles cast the available options as being
either adult punishment or a “slap on the wrist,” suggesting that if teens are not held fully
responsible for their crimes, they would bear no criminal responsibility at all.46 Child advocates
often seem to accept these constrained choices. Thus in the policy debate, both sides appeared
to agree that youths charged with crimes would either be treated as children in juvenile court or
tried and punished as adults. Across the country, lawmakers opted for public protection by
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In a 1989 study, 70% of those questioned stated that the leniency of the juvenile system was a cause of
violent youth crime. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 157 (Timothy Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire, eds. 1990).
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See, e.g. Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away With Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs an
Overhaul, 34 POL’Y REV. 65, 68 (1985) (“[T]here is no reason that society should be more lenient with a 16 year old
first offender than a 30 year old first offender.”); Virginia Ellis, Lungren to Seek Lower Age for Trial as Adult, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993 at A3 (quoting California Attorney General Dan Lungren: “[I]f you commit an adult crime,
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Sentences in Adult Jails, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 10, 1995 at A16 (quoting New York Governor Pataki: “Adult crime
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redefining adolescent offenders (or many of them) as adults.
Supporters may present these reforms as a coherent policy response to a new generation
of dangerous young criminals. But close inspection reveals that often the process has had the
hallmarks of a moral panic, in which politicians, the media and the public have reinforced each
other in a pattern of escalating alarm about the seriousness of the threat of youth violence and the
urgent need to respond.47 Sometimes the process is triggered by a high-profile crime that stirs
public fears. In Arkansas, for example, legislative reforms lowering the minimum age of criminal
adjudication for juveniles followed the Jonesboro school shootings in which two youths, ages 11
and 13, killed six school mates and a teacher.48 Seldom is reform undertaken with the kind of
thoughtful deliberation one might expect to inform legal and institutional changes of such
importance.
As my earlier analysis demonstrates, this legal trend\ move offends proportionality– a
core principle of criminal law. The developmental psychology evidence does not support a
justice system that treats young offenders as children whose crimes are excused, but it does
support a mitigation-based model that treats adolescents as a separate legal category of offenders
who are less blameworthy and deserve less punishment than typical adult offenders. The
47
ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 1
(1994). Goode and Ben-Yehuda have wriiten an authoritative analysis of the phenomenon. They describe the
elements of a moral panic as follows: Great community concern focused on a particular type of deviant behavior, an
exaggerated perception of the harm threatened, a general hostility towards the offenders throughout the community,
and a sense of urgency about the need for action in response. The public response to child sexual abuse at various
times, often triggered by a salient incident, has often had the attributes of a moral panic.
48

In Jonesboro, Andrew Gooden and ???, ages 11-and 13, brought guns to school and killed a teacher and
four Right number of victims?? Change this or text. young girls outside of a middle school. Rick Bragg, Judge
Punishes Arkansas Boys Who Kill 5, NEW YORK TIMES, August 12, 1998 at A1. After the incident, Arkansas passed
the Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction Act, which enabled prosecutors to charge any child with murder, as long as he
appeared to possess the requisite mental state and understood the criminal consequences of his conduct. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-501(Lexis 1999) (stating that a prosecutor may charge a child under 13 with murder if “the state has
overcome presumptions about the lack of fitness to proceed and lack of capacity.”).
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distinction between excuse and mitigation seems straightforward, but it is often misunderstood.
Even Justice Scalia, who should know better, makes this error in his Simmons dissent. In
criticizing the majority for (in his view) finding juveniles to lack responsibility, Scalia seemed
to forget that, having escaped the death penalty, Simmons would spend the rest of his life in
prison.49
C. The Utilitarian Case for Developmentally-Based Policies
In reality, although the scientific evidence of adolescent immaturity is compelling, it is
unlikely that principle alone will dictate youth crime policy. Ultimately, the most compelling
argument for a separate less punitive system for dealing with young criminals rests on utilitarian
grounds. An important lesson of the research on juvenile crime by Moffitt and others is that
most delinquent youths, even those who commit serious crimes, are “adolescent-limited”
offenders who are likely to mature out of their anti-social tendencies. These youths are not
headed for careers in crime–unless correctional interventions push them in that direction. Thus, it
is critical that youth crime policy not lose sight of the impact of sanctions on the future life
prospects of young offenders. Effective sanctions that invest in the human capital of young
offenders are likely to promote the interests of society as well as those of the youths themselves,
as long as public safety is not unduly compromised.
Supporters of the recent reforms argue that tough policies promote social welfare by
protecting the public from the harm of youth crime. Their calculus is distorted, however, because
it exaggerates the threat (in part by not acknowledging the steady decline in juvenile crime rates
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for more than a decade)50 and because it discounts (or fails to include) the potential costs of
harsh punishment. For starters, the concrete economic costs of incarcerating youths are
substantial; dollars spent on prisons are not available for education or other social programs– a
fact that some state legislatures are beginning to recognize, particularly in the context of adult
sentencing policy.51 But just as important are the human costs. Although research on the impact
of adult incarceration on normative adolescent offenders is not yet extensive, the available
evidence suggests that imprisonment undermines social maturation and educational progress and
likely contributes to recidivism. Psychologists view adolescence as a critical developmental
stage during which youths acquire competencies, skills and experiences essential to the
successful transition to conventional adult roles. If the experience of youths in the correctional
system disrupts educational and social development severely, it may irreversibly undermine
prospects for gainful employment, successful family formation and engaged citizenship.52 My
point is that under a valid utilitarian calculus, policies and programs will be measured by asking
50

California, legislators passed Proposition 21 in 2000, significantly expanding the category of youths who
could be subject to adult prosecution and punishment; at the time, youth crime rates had been steadily declining for
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juvenile homicide declined steeply beginning in the mid 1990s; Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Recapturing the Child in
Adult Court, 16 CRIM. JUST. 58, 58 (2002)(describing the public’s misperception that an “epidemic” of juvenile crime
exists, despite a decline in juvenile crime rates).
51
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not only whether the public will be safer in the short run, but also whether youths after their
involvement in the justice system will be more– or less– likely to desist from criminal activity,
to stay in school, to get steady employment as adults and to develop long term relationships that
bring stability to their lives.
The effectiveness of juvenile correctional programs has been the subject of debate for
decades and, until recently most researchers were quite pessimistic about the ability of such
programs to have a positive influence on young offenders. The findings of a much cited study
by Lipton, Martinson & Wilks in the mid-70s can be (and often has been) summarized in two
words– “Nothing Works.”53 In the past decade or so, however, new programs (such as Scott
Hengelaar’s multi-systemic therapy) and more sophisticated methods of statistical analysis have
contributed to a brighter picture.54 A growing body of programmatic outcome research indicates
that interventions that invest in the human capital of young offenders can enhance their prospects
for becoming productive adults and diminish the risk of recidivism.55
53

DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF
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This does not mean that we should return to the traditional juvenile justice system–
accountability and punishment are essential components in the legal response to juvenile crime.
But, both adult prisons and juvenile correctional programs can hold young offenders
accountable– and a separate juvenile system is better situated to respond in ways that promote
positive youth development.
Under a mitigation model, most young criminals would be dealt with in the juvenile
system. From a developmental perspective, punishing a 16 year old car thief or small time drug
dealer as an adult is short-sighted – because these are typical adolescent crimes. But a justice
policy that takes mitigation seriously is viable only to the extent that public protection is not
seriously compromised. Some adolescent criminals cause a great deal of harm and are not
particularly deserving of mitigation– older violent recividists, for example– these youths should
be tried and punished as adults. This safety valve is essential to the stability of the juvenile
justice system. A lesson of the collapse of the rehabilitative model is that an effective legal
regime must pay attention to the public’s legitimate concerns about safety .
This is a good time to reflect on youth crime policy. The alarm that fueled the punitive
reforms has subsided as juvenile crime rates have fallen for several years. Even supporters of
tough policies have had second thoughts. John DiIulio, who coined the term “super-predators”
in the mid-1990s, recently expressed regret about this characterization of young offenders and
acknowledged that his predictions about the threat of juvenile crime had not been realized.56

importance of intervention programs to reduce recidivism).
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During an interview in which he expressed regret for advocating teen prison sentences and condemning
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Moreover, recent research suggests that the public may be less enthusiastic about
punitive policies than politicians seem to believe. Last year my colleagues and I conducted what
is called a “contingent valuation survey” in which we probed how much 1500 Pennsylvania
residents were willing to pay (through increased taxes) for either incarceration or rehabilitation
programs for juveniles.57 The alternatives were described– (accurately, according to the
research) – as offering a similar prospect of crime reduction. We found that participants were
willing to pay more for rehabilitation than for punishment– a mean of $98.00 for rehabilitation v
$81.00 for incarceration. Of course, this kind of survey is somewhat artificial– since the
willingness-to-pay question was hypothetical– nonetheless, these findings should be interesting
to policy makers, – particularly in light of facts about the two options that we did not disclose to
our participants– that a year of juvenile incarceration actually costs five times as much as a yearlong rehabilitation program.58
Our study, and other recent survey evidence suggest that the public cares about safety but
is quite open to programs in the juvenile system as a way of reducing juvenile crime.59
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Politicians claim that the public demands “get-tough” policies, but this may often be a transitory
response to highly publicized crimes– the moral panic I described earlier. The evidence suggests
that, in calmer times, public opinion is far less punitive. Thus, the political risk that policymakers
face in responding cautiously to public pressure in the wake of these incidents may not be as
great as they might surmise.
There is some evidence that legislatures also are having second thoughts about the
punitive laws that they have enacted in the past generation. This may be partly in response to
lower juvenile crime rates and partly in recognition of the reality that adult prosecution and
punishment of juveniles carry high costs. In several states, punitive laws have been repealed or
scaled back. In 2005, for example, Illinois repealed a statute mandating adult prosecution of 15
year olds charged with selling drugs near schools.60 Lawmakers may be ready today to
approach juvenile justice policy more thoughtfully than they have in a generation. If so, a large
body of recent research that was not available 20 years ago offers insights about adolescence and
about young offenders. My hope is that this scientific knowledge can influence the direction of
juvenile justice policy.

Surveys conducted in Georgia suggested similar public support for rehabilitative programs, where only 15 percent of
those polled expressed the belief that punishment should be the main goal of the juvenile justice system. Id. at 1073.
60

ILL. COMP. STATS. ANN. § 405/5-130(1)(a)(2006). See also Scott Ehler, State Legislative Affairs Update,
CHAMPION, Dec. 29, 2005 at 48. In 2005, Delaware amended an automatic transfer statute requiring youths accused
of robbery and burglary to be sent to criminal court. The new law limited the conditions under which young
offenders could automatically be transferred to criminal court. Id. The Connecticut legislature enacted a new law in
2005 affording juveniles a presumptive youthful offender status for lower level offenses, which would preserve the
confidentiality of their offenses and set a maximum sentence of four years. Id.
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